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Civil Procedure
BY JOHN R. LEATHERS,* ROXANE M. TOMASI,**
AND JEFFREY B. HUNT='"
INTRODUCTION
A basic problem facing Kentucky practitioners when dealing
with civil procedure matters is the scarcity of state cases and ma-
terials interpreting the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Aside
from Kentucky cases, Clay's Kentucky Practice, is the only state
source to help interpret the rules. This source, however, may not
be as detailed as necessary in order to solve a problem of first im-
pression in Kentucky.
An obvious guide for interpreting the Kentucky Rules is in-
terpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [FRCPI.2
Kentucky cases often cite as authority federal rules decisions by
the federal courts. 3 Although some Kentucky cases depart from
the federal construction of the rules, 4 the Kentucky courts will
normally seek parity between the state and the federal rules. The
rationale for this uniformity is to "promote ease of practice in the
federal and state courts of Kentucky," 5 and to avoid "the creation
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; J.D. 1971, University of
New Mexico; LL.M. 1973, Columbia University.
J.D., University of Kentucky, 1981.
J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1983.
'6 & 7 W. CLAY, KENTucKY PRACTICE (3d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1980).
2 The similarity between the federal and state rules decisions have led Clay to in-
clude federal decisional law in his work as a guide to construing the Kentucky rules. For
the most part, the wording of the Kentucky and federal rules is identical. 6 W. CLAY,
supra note l, at Rule 1, § 3.
3 E.g., Scudamore v. Horton, 426 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Ky. 1968) (citing federal court
of appeals); Jackson & Church Div., York-Shipley, Inc. v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 893, 894
(Ky. 1967) (citing federal district court decisions); Jackson v. Metcalf, 404 S.W.2d 793,
794 (Ky. 1966) (citing United States Supreme Court).
4 See, e.g., Pearman v. Scblaak, 575 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1978). Justice Reed, dissent-
ing in Pearman, argues that the real issue is intervention of right after judgment for pur-
poses of appeal. There is considerable federal authority in support of the dissenting opin-
ion and in all probability the result is based on the facts of the case rather than a departure
from the federal standard. Id. at 466 (Reed, J., dissenting).
5 Id.
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of a trap for the unwary lawyer who attempts to practice in both
the state and federal courts in Kentucky."6
With this parity between state and federal interpretations
comes the availability of the comprehensive treatises and articles
on the federal rules, including the major treatises by Charles
Wright and Arthur Miller7 and by J. W. Moore.8 Despite Profes-
sor Moore's prominence in drafting the original federal rules,
there is a discernible preference in recent Kentucky cases for the
Wright and Miller work (hereinafter referred to as Wright and
Miller), over the Moore treatise (hereinafter referred to as
Moore),9 probably because Wright and Miller is easier to read
and use.
This Survey of important Kentucky civil procedure cases em-
phasizes the instances in which Kentucky courts rely on federal
authority. Further, this Survey develops a general analytical
framework helpful to practitioners confronted with civil proce-
dure problems. Practitioners should be aware that Kentucky
courts demand strict adherence to the rules, thus departing from
the substantial compliance theory espoused by the federal courts
in interpreting the federal rules. 10
6ld.
7 8 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(1969-80) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. This West publication is the current
successor to earlier editions by W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE (1950) and C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1958-61). The work
is updated with pocket parts.
8 j. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE]. This multi-volume set is updated with loose-leaf inserts and periodic rewriting of
sections.
9 See, e.g., Ashland Pub. Library Bd. of Trustees v. Scott, 610 S.W.2d 895 (Ky.
1981). In that case, the Court "adopt[ed] the simple and sensible rules advocated in 7A
WRIGHT AND MILLER...." Id. at 896.
10 FED. R. CIv. P. 1 [hereinafter cited as FRCP] allows trial courts wide discretion in
application of the rules. It states that the rules '"shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Id. Ky. R. Civ. P. 1 [hereinafter
cited as CR] has no equivalent wording. The lack of this "liberal" ideal in the Kentucky
rules is a partial explanation for the strict compliance theory of the Kentucky courts. On
the other hand, the liberality in FRCP 1 which gives rise to the substantial compliance
concept, applies throughout the federal rules. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979) (discovery rules to be interpreted in light of the discretion afforded the trial court in
FRCP 1); Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. 1980) (trial courts rely on
FRCP 1 to apply all the rules through substance over form). See also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 7, at § 1029; 2 MOORE, supra note 8, at 1.13[1].
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I. WANT OF PROSECUTION
In 1978, Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 77.02(2),1"
requiring periodic review of the civil docket, was added to the
rules to give the courts more control over their own dockets. The
rule has no counterpart in the federal rules, and has therefore
been strictly construed. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted
discretionary review of Bohannon v. Rutland,1.2 to consider the
scope of CR 77.02(2). In Bohannon, Phillip Bohannon filed a
complaint on August 25, 1978. Rutland tried to negotiate with
Bohannon and presented several out-of-court settlement offers
which were refused.
Nearly a year later, Rutland moved for, and the trial court
granted a dismissal of the suit under CR 77.02(2). Rutland al-
leged that Bohannon had taken "no further affirmative steps" to
advance the suit after filing the complaint. 13 The court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal, holding that CR 77.02(2) applies when
the plaintiff fails to advance the suit toward a decision.14
The Supreme Court reversed, construing the phrase "no
pretrial steps"' s to mean no activity by either party. The Court
further stated that the purpose of CR 77.02(2) was to give trial
court judges a "means by which they may periodically review
their dockets and purge them of cases which have lapsed into in-
activity."'1 The Court held that Rutland's depositions, interroga-
tories and settlement negotiations were sufficient activity by a
party to the suit to prevent dismissal by the trial court under CR
77.02(2).
In dicta, the Court pointed out that the involuntary dismissal
rule of CR 41.02(1)17 would have been the proper mode of dismis-
" CR 77.02(2) requires that the trial courts review their dockets a minimum of once
a year and to dismiss those cases in which "no pretrial steps has been taken" and good
cause cannot be shown within thirty days of the trial court's decision to dismiss.
12 616 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1981).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 47.
Is See note 11 supra for the text of CR 77.02(2).
16 616 S.W.2d at 47. Accord W. CLAY, supra note 1, at Rule 77.02(2) comment
(Supp. 1980).
'7 CR 41.02(1) provides: "For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or any order of the court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of
any claim against him."
1981-82]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
sal because of the plaintiff's failure to prosecute. A defendant
who has attempted to advance the case while the plaintiff has
been inactive may request a dismissal under CR 41.02(1), but not
under CR 77.02(2).18 As a result, CR 77.02(2) is to be utilized
either by the court sua sponte or by the plaintiff or defendant
when neither party has attempted to advance the case beyond
the "pleading stage," while CR 41.02(1) serves as a remedy for
the defendant when the plaintiff fails to prosecute. 19
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Many state courts have difficulty distinguishing the due pro-
cess requirements of notice of a suit against nonresident defen-
dants from the requirements of in personam jurisdiction. That
confusion is well illustrated by the court of appeals' decision in
Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co.20 In Cox, the court of appeals upheld
the trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment in favor of
the plaintiff despite the defendant's claim that he was not prop-
erly served with process. The out-of-state defendant was served
in accordance with the long-arm statute, Kentucky Revised Sta-
tutes (KRS) section 454.210.21 The process agent for the defen-
dant testified that he had received a registered letter sent by the
plaintiff but had thrown it away believing it to be junk mail.22
The court of appeals ruled that although actual notice is gen-
erally not required by due process to effectuate proper service
under the long-arm statute,e a showing of no actual notice may,
18 616 S.W.2d at47.
19 Id.
20 589 S.W.2d 606 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
21 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(3)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1980) [herein-
after cited as KRS] provides that the secretary of state is to send the letter "by certified
mail, return receipt requested and shall bear the return address of the secretary of state."
2 5 9 S.W.2d at 607.
23 Id. No Kentucky cases are directly on point, but the Cox court found that dicta in
White v. Jayne, 230 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1950), supported its view that actual notice was not
required to obtain personal jurisdiction under the Kentucky long-arm statute. White in-
volved service of process under the nonresident motorist statute, and held that service of
process was not properly achieved. The Cox court relied on dicta in White to the effect
that if the registered letter had in fact been delivered as addressed, the defendant could not
complain of improper service, even though the receipt may have been signed by another
person residing at that residence. 589 S.W.2d at 607.
[Vol. 70
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in some circumstances, constitute sufficient cause to set aside a
default judgment. If the movant shows that notice in fact was
not received and demonstrates a meritorious defense, then the
default judgment should be set aside.Y In Cox, however, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order refusing to set
aside the default judgment because it believed that:
[T]here was sufficient evidence to establish to a reasonable
probability that appellant did have notice or, at the very least,
was furnished sufficient information to place him on a kind of
inquiry notice to find out about the letter and its contents.
Having failed to take available steps which could have pro-
tected his interests, appellant cannot be heard now to com-
plain that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
grant him postjudgment relief.25
The decision in Cox would have confronted the problem
more clearly if the court had discussed the matter in terms of no-
tice and eliminated the references to personal jurisdiction. The
nonresident defendant in Cox was obviously subject to in per-
sonam jurisdiction in Kentucky under the long-arm statute.2 The
question which the court was trying to address was whether ac-
tual notice is required in order to satisfy procedural due process
or whether some lesser showing suffices. Under Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Trust,"I the requirement of notice is as clearly a re-
quirement of due process as is the existence of jurisdiction, but
notice may be satisfied by the implementation of a scheme
"reasonably calculated to inform" 2 the defendant of the suit.
The Cox case illustrates Kentucky courts' reliance on federal
authority. The court cited both West's Federal Practice and a no-
24589 S.W.2d at 607.
25 d.
2 For in personam jurisdiction, the court apparently relied on KRS § 454.210(2) (a)
(Cum. Supp. 1980) which, in part, authorizes courts to exercise jurisdiction over persons:
"Contracting to supply services of goods in this Commonwealth." See note 23 supra for
Cox's jurisdictional discussion.
27 339 U.S. 306 (1950). This is the due process standard for notice in civil actions.
The United States Supreme Court said "the means employed must be such as one desirous




tice decision by the federal court in Indiana.29 Indeed, the Cox
holding had to conform to federal standards since the due process
notice requirements of Mullane apply to both state and federal
cases. 30 This connection, however, is not intimated by the court
in Cox. Although the result in Cox is correct, the court could
have more correctly identified the basis for the holding.
III. IN PERSONAM JUlISDICTION-WAVER OF DEFECT
The court of appeals' decision in Williams v. Indiana Refrig-
erator Lines, Inc.31 illustrates a result which is in accord with
federal law and at the same time demonstrates strict adherence
to the letter of the rules. The nonresident defendant answered
the original complaint without raising the defense of lack of in
personam jurisdiction in the answer or through prior motions.
The defendant subsequently engaged in various discovery proce-
dures and even attempted to remove the case to the federal
courts. After the plaintiff filed an amended complaint which
added a party, but which did not alter the substance of the ac-
tion, the defendant then moved to dismiss for lack of in personam
jurisdiction.32 Under the rules, lack of personal jurisdiction must
be raised as a defense by motion prior to answer,33 or raised in the
answer. The rules clearly indicate that lack of personal jurisdic-
tion is a disfavored defense and that a failure to raise such a de-
fense in a pre-answer motion or in the answer will result in a
waiver of the defense. 34
29 589 S.W.2d at 607 (citing Milosavljevic v. Brooks, 55 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Ind.
1972)).
30 339 U.S. at 314-15.
"' 612 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
32 Id. at 351.
33 qR 12.02 provides in pertinent part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading ... shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by mo-
tion: ... (b) lack of jurisdiction over the person.
34 CR 12.08(1) states:
A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, in-
sufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (a) if
omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12.07, or (b) if
[Vol. 70
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In Williars, the court held that the engagement of the de-
fendant in the various activities, when coupled with the failure
to raise the jurisdictional defect in a timely fashion, resulted in a
waiver of the issue. Although the decision lacks citations to fed-
eral cases or treatises, it is in line with both.3 Furthermore, the
decision is a strict application of the waiver terms of CR
12.08(1).
In a somewhat related case, the court of appeals held that a
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction has no res judicata ef-
fects on the merits of the dismissed action. The effect of this rul-
ing in Mitchell v. Money37 was to allow the plaintiff to instigate a
second action following dismissal of the first because of the lack
of personal jurisdiction. The case is somewhat unusual in that the
court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant in the first action
was dead; the second action thus had to be brought against the
decedent's administrator. The holding is correct in view of the
clear language of CR 41.02(3) that a jurisdictional dismissal is
not a dismissal on the merits, and is in line with federal author-
ities, even though the court failed to cite the authorities most
clearly on point. 8
IV. AMENDED PLEADINGS-RELATION BACK
The Kentucky Supreme Court considered the amendment of
complaints in Perkins v. Read.-9 In 1973, Geneva Perkins filed a
wrongful death action for the death of her husband resulting
from a 1972 automobile collision. In 1976, well beyond the one
year statute of limitati6ns for personal injury actions, 40 Perkins
it is neither made by motion under Rule 12 nor included in a responsive
pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 15.01 to be made as a
matter of course.
3' 612 S.W.2d at 351.
- See, e.g., Graff v. Nieberg, 233 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1956); 5 WRIHT & MILLER,
supra note 7, at S 1351; MooRE, supra note 8, at 12.23.
37 602 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
38 See, e.g., Costell v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); Martinez v. Richardson,
472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973); Miller v. Saxbe, 396 F. Supp. 1260 (D.C.D.C. 1975); 9
WRHT & MILLER. supra note 7, at § 2373; 5 MOORE, supra note 8, at 41.1411].
39 616 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1981).
40 See KRS § 413.140 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
1981-82]
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amended the complaint alleging damages for her personal in-
juries stemming from the same accident. The court of appeals af-
firmed the circuit's court denial of the amendment which had
been based on the statute of limitations.41
The Supreme Court reversed, allowing the amendment of
Perkins' personal injury to relate back to the original complaint
under CR 15.03's test of matters arising from the same "conduct,
transaction, or occurrence." 42 Since pleadings serve a notice func-
tion,43 any claim arising out of the factual situation of the orig-
inal complaint properly tolls the statute of limitations. The Court
differentiated this from an amendment following the running of
the limitations period in which a new party or unrelated cause of
action is added to the original factual situation." Where the
claims that are the subject of the amendment arise from the
transaction already the subject of the complaint, a defendant is
not burdened. 4
5
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court failed to cite either
federal cases or treatises, the result is justified by both. Basing the
decision on a rationale of notice to the defendant is the approach
of both Wright and Miller4 and is also in accord with Moore47 as
well as several federal cases.4
V. APPELLATE REVIEW OF TmALS BY DEPOSITION
In Stafford v. Stafford,49 the court of appeals reviewed a
child custody case tried by deposition under CR 43.04.-10 The trial
41 616 S.W.2d at 495.
42 CR 15.03(1) states: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading."
43 Perkins v. Read, 616 S.W.2d at 496. See also Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., 414
S.W.2d 908, 911 (Ky. 1907); 6 W. CLAY, supra note 1, at Rule 15.03 comment 3.
44 616S.W.2d at 496.
4 Id.
46 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, at § 1497.
47 MooRsupra note 8, at 15.15[3].48 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1968); Hockett v.
American Airlines, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. M1l. 1973).
49 618 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
50 CR 43.04(1) provides in part: "In all trials concerning alimony or divorce... the
[Vol. 70
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judge awarded custody of the two children to Etta Stafford. Her
ex-husband appealed, alleging that the overwhelming weight of
the evidence did not support the custody award.
The decision of the trial court sitting as a fact-finder under
CR 52.01 will not be overturned unless the appellate court views
the findings to be "clearly erroneous."'51 The court of appeals
noted the policies in support of the rule: the opportunity for the
trial court judge to scrutinize both the demeanor of the witnesses
and the evidence, and the avoidance of duplicating the trial
court's function. 52
The court of appeals then held that the clearly erroneous
standard is inapplicable to cases tried solely by deposition under
CR 43.04.0 The court relied on Burchett v. Jones,54 an earlier
case tried entirely on depositions, in which the Court of Appeals
(then Kentucky's highest court) stated:
While CR 52.01 requires that due regard be given the opportu-
nity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
the form of the evidence is significant .... [T]he trial court
did not have an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses who gave oral testimony. Under the circumstances,
we believe we are in as advantageous a position to pass upon
credibility as was the trial court and may properly evaluate the
evidence.s'
Applying the Burchett rule in Stafford, the court concluded
that under CR 52.01, the factual record did not support the trial
judge's findings. 56 The court of appeals in effect granted a new
testimony shall be taken by deposition, unless the court by order... requires the testi-
mony to be heard under oath and orally in open court." The court of appeals questioned
the appropriateness of trial by deposition in a child custody case; however, it did not ad-
dress this issue, leaving it open for future consideration. 618 S.W.2d at 578 n.1.
51 CR 52.01 requires that the factfmdings of a judge with either no jury or an advis-
ory jury "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses .
52 618 S.W.2d at 579.
3 Id. See also Taylor v. Taylor, 591 S.W.2d 369 (Ky. 1979); Stephanski v. Stephan-
ski, 473 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1971); Barnes v. Barnes, 458 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1970).
54 291 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1956). See also Bush v. Putty, 566 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978).
,' 291 S.W.2d at 34 (quoted in Stafford v. Stafford, 618 S.W.2d at 580).
56 618 S.W.2d at 580-81. The court noted that the trial judge's findings under CR
1981-821
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trial or retrial with itself acting as a fact-finder on the deposi-
tions. The Stafford court said that Burchett places it on "an
equal footing with the trial court."57
Although the court does cite the federal case of United States
v. Merz,5s that decision is not on point for the holding that the
appellate court may substitute its own view of the facts in cases
tried by deposition. Given the facts in Stafford, it is doubtful that
such a "rule" is the real basis of the result. The citation to Merz
indicates that there was no factual support in the record for the
trial judge's opinion. 59 This is further indicated by the court of
appeals' observation that the trial judges decision to give custody
to the mother was based on a preference for maternal custody.A0
That preference, the court noted, has been eliminated by the
1980 amendments to the relevant statute.61 It thus appears that
there was simply no support for the trial court's result, and over-
ruling the result would be correct even under the "clearly erro-
neous" standard.
The court's position in Stafford concerning review of trial by
depositions should not be taken at face value.62 While it is correct
52.01 (set out in part in note 51 supra) did not support the court's custody award. Citing
United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192 (1964), the court of appeals further discussed the im-
portance of the specificity of the trial court judge's factfindings and concluded that the
trial court's findings stated only bare conclusions and not the means of reaching those con-
clusions. 618 S.W.2d at 580.
The court stated that the trial court must "consider all relevant factors including
those specifically enumerated in the statute [KRS § 403.270(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980), the
child custody'statute]." Id. at 580. See also Kentucky Mountain Coal Co. v. Hacker, 412
S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967); Standard Farm Stores v. Dixon, 339 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1960);
Fleming v. Rife, 328 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. 1959).
57 618 S.W.2d at 581. The combination of lack of specificity in the trial court's fact-
findings and the Burchett rule gives the court of appeals the same authority to consider
depositions as if it were another trial court.
58 376 U.S. 192 (1964) (cited in Stafford v. Stafford, 618 S.W.2d at 580).
59 See United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. at 192.
6o 618 S.W.2d at 581. See Casale v. Casale, 549 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1977); McLemore
v. McLemore, 346 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1961).
61 KRS § 403.270(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
62 In fact, it appears that Burchett does not support the proposition that the "clearly
eroroneous" standard is inapplicable to cases tried solely by depositions under CR 43.04.
The Court in Burchett stated that they found the trial court's decision to be "dearly erro-
neous" and reversed for that reason. 291 S.W.2d at 34. Recently, the court of appeals
recognized this language in Burchett in Largent v. Largent, 28 Ky. L. SuMm. 16, at 3 (Ky.
1981-82] SURVEY- CIVIL PROCEDURE
to say that the normal deference given to a trial judge, grounded
on the opportunity to judge witnesses' credibility, is not present
in such a case, it is not necessarily true that there is no reason to
defer to the trial judge's fact findings in a trial by deposition. It
makes good practical sense to defer to a trial judge even in trials
by deposition simply in order to avoid having every such case de-
cided all over again by the appellate court.
VI. DESIGNATION OF RECORD
In Seale v. Riley,63 the court of appeals gave "notice to the
Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1981) (unpublished) [hereinafter cited as KLS]. In Largent, the court of
appeals recognized the apparent problem they had created in Stafford. In Largent, the
court of appeals stated that Stafford's holding that the "clearly erroneous" standard is in-
applicable to trials by deposition was "dictum [and that .... clertainly, the panel of this
court that decided Stafford feels differently." 28 KLS 16, at 3.
The court of appeals discussed CR 52.01 and admitted that the appellate court is
on equal ground with the trial court when all the evidence is submitted through deposi-
tions; however, CR 52.01 also contains a statement that the appellate court is to defer "to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." In Largent, the
court of appeals refused to disturb the trial court's ruling, even though the case was tried
by depositions because: (1) the decision was not clearly erroneous; and (2) "the trial judge
may... have [had] some advantage in judging credibility by either knowing the parties
or witnesses or by having had the same parties before him in an earlier proceeding." 28
KLS 16, at 4.
The court of appeals noted in Largent that CR 52.01's "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard is uncertain as applied to trials by deposition under CR 43.04 due to the conflicting
language of Stafford and Largent. The court of appeals called on the Kentucky Supreme
Court to settle the issue:
We are mindful of the confusion of the holdings in this case and Staf-
ford may create with the bar and the trial bench with reference to our scope
of review in cases of this type, but hope that one party here will seek discre-
tionary review with the Kentucky Supreme Court who will then have the
opportunity to clarify this area of the law for the trial court, bar and the
Court of Appeals.'
28 KLS 16, at 3-4 n.1.
The position in regard to factual review of trials before a judge on written evi-
dence is also unclear in the federal system under FRCP 52(a) which is the "model" for CR
52.01. Such a power has been asserted in Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 340 U.S. 810 (1950), but the decision in that case was in fact based on the "clearly
erroneous" standard as was Burcheti in Kentucky. The power -has been rejected in Fender-
grass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1950). Such "retrial" on appeal of
evidence by depositions or in other written form is criticized in Wright, The Doubtful
Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 14 MmN. L. REv. 751, 782 (1957).
63 602 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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bar of the standards against which minimum compliance with
CR 75.014 will be measured."s Concerning the rule, the court
held:
[Amny designation of evidence or proceedings stenographically
reported filed in accordance with CR 75.01 after August 1,
1980, which designates only "the entire trial court record"
shall be held improper and will be grounds for dismissal of the
appeal as if no designation had been filed. Attorneys are here-
by placed on notice that the designation filed pursuant to CR
75.01 should state with particularity those portions of the evi-
dence or proceedings stenographically reported as the party
'wishes to be included in the record on appeal. A blanket desig-
nation of "the entire trial court record" is not acceptable.
The majority opinion does not clearly identify the departures
from the rules to which it objected. The court may have been ob-
jecting to the use of the "entire trial court record" as not distin-
guishing between the original record maintained by the clerk and
the evidence or proceedings stenographically reported. On the
other hand, it may have been objecting to the inclusion of all
stenographically reported evidence in the record instead of just
those portions necessary to the appeal.
The concurring opinion67 in Seale interpreted the majority's
6 The court of appeals summarized CR 75.01 as follows:
(1) Unless an agreed statement of the case is certified as provided in Rule
75.15, within 10 days after filing a notice of appeal the appellant shallserve
upon the appellee and file in the trial court a designation of such portions of
the evidence of proceedings stenographically reported as he wishes to be in-
cluded in the record on appeal, unless the appellee has already served and
filed a designation. Within 10 days after the service and filing of such desig-
nation, any other party to the appeal may serve and file a designation of ad-
ditional portions of the evidence or proceedings stenographically reported as
he wishes to be included. If the appellee files the original designation, the
parties shall proceed under Rule 75.02 as if the appellee were the appellant.
(emphasis added by the court in Seale v. Riley, 602 S.W.2d at 442-43). It should be noted
that the quoted text of CR 75.01-Designation of Evidence or Proceedings Stenograph-
ically Reported-differs from the current version, appearing in the KENTucKY RULES OF
COUnT, DESK COPY (1981) (as amended July 1, 1981).
6 602 S.W.2d at 442.
6 Id. at 443.
67 Justice Wilhoit and Justice Howard concurred in the result in Seale. Justice Wil-
hoit stated "I concur in the majority opinion only because it does not dismiss the instant
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opinion as objecting to the party's failure to distinguish between
the clerk's record and the stenographically reported documents.
It should be noted that the record maintained by the clerk is al-
ways included in the record on appeal,, while stenographically
reported documents are included only when specifically desig-
nated by the parties. 69 Viewing the majority's interpretation of
CR 75.01 as "hypertechnical,"70 the Seale concurrence would
have held a designation of the "entire trial court record" to be
sufficient, stating: "Inasmuch as CR 75.07(1) requires the clerk
to certify the entire record anyway, it seems to me that a designa-
tion such as we have here7' obviously means that the entire tran-
script of evidence is designated." 72 The concurrence felt that its
interpretation of the designation issue was supported by the
number of appeals before them where all the stenographically re-
ported documents had been included on the basis of a designa-
tion of the "entire trial court record." 73
If the Seale majority was in fact objecting to the use of the
term "entire trial court record" on this ground, then it has indeed
given a "hypertechnical" interpretation to CR 75.01. A designa-
tion of "all transcripts of evidence or proceedings stenographical-
ly reported" should then be sufficient to comply with the rule.
The court, however, may have been objecting to the nature of
the designation, not the form. That is, the court may not have
been objecting to the use of "the entire court record" instead of
"all stenographically reported documents," but rather, it may
have been objecting to the inclusion of all stenographically re-
ported evidence in the record instead of just those portions neces-
sary to the appeal. This interpretation is supported by the court's
declaration that the purpose of CR 75.01 is to "require the appel-
lant in each case to define those portions of the stenographically
appeal and because we are giving the bar this notice of the hypertechnical interpretation
we plan to give CR 75.01." 602 S.W.2d at 443 (Wilhoit, J., concurring).
6 CR 75.07(1).
69 CR 75.07(2).
70602 S.W.2d at 443 (Wilhoit, J., concurring).
71 The "Designation of Record on Appeal" before the court read: "Pursuant to Rule
75.01 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedures [sic] the plaintifflappellant designates the
entire trial court record to be included in the record on appeal." Id. at 442.
72 Id. at 443 (emphasis in original).
73 Id. at 443-44.
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recorded proceedings in the circuit court which the appellant
wishes to add to the clerk's original record in support of his posi-
tion on his appeal." 74 Further support for this interpretation of
the court's reasoning is its statement that "[tlhe designation
which the appellant is required to file by CR 75.01 is intended to
define those parts of the transcript which the appellant wishes in-
cluded in the record on appeal under CR 75.07(2)."75
If the court's objective was to ensure designation of specific
portions of stenographically recorded evidence, then its position
is consistent with CR 75.05 which provides that:
No party shall designate any matter not essential to the de-
cision of the questions presented by the appeal. For any infrac-
tion of this Rule ... the appellate court may withhold or im-
pose costs as the circumstances of the case and discouragement
of like conduct in the future may require; and costs may be im-
posed upon offending attorneys or parties.
Application of the sanctions in CR 75.05, however, would ap-
pear to be a more appropriate remedy than dismissal of the ap-
peal. Use of these sanctions would meet the objectives of the
majority in Seale to force attorneys to be explicit in their designa-
tions, while making it less likely that litigants' appeals would be
settled by procedural issues rather than on the merits.
The designation of record issue is one where no help or guid-
ance can be found in federal materials, as there is no requirement
in the federal rules analogous to CR 75.01. While it may make
sense on the surface to require an exact listing of the portions of
the stenographically reported evidence which will be contested
on appeal, that is a position which can work only in a perfect
world. In the imperfect world in which Kentucky practitioners
must work, it is not unusual to encounter delays of six months or
more in receiving transcripts of civil trials, long after the time has
run for the designation of the record. The future reading which
will be given to Seale should be to allow a general description of
the portions of the transcript relevant to the appeal; any rule re-
quiring a more definite statement will be unworkable and can
only have disastrous consequences.
74 Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
75 Id. (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
It should be noted that the cases discussed in this Survey are
not all the cases involving procedural issues to come before the
Kentucky appellate courts during the Survey period. The cases
discussed were chosen because they represent the most important
and commonly encountered issues. It is hoped that these discus-
sions serve to keep the practitioner informed of developments
and that the framework of federal decisional law and federal
treatises can provide guidelines for problems not yet encountered
in Kentucky.

